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 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 








 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
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 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A098-868-065) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 22, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN Circuit Judges 
 







 YuPing Xu petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA”) 




  Xu is a citizen of China who entered the United States in 2001 on a visitor‟s visa, 
which she overstayed.  In 2010, the Government charged her as removable for being 
present without having been admitted or paroled.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Xu 
conceded the charge but applied for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) on two grounds.  First, Xu claims to have suffered 
past persecution under China‟s coercive family planning policies.  Xu gave birth to two 
children in China, where they remain.  She claims that she lost her job after having her 
second child and that Chinese authorities thereafter required her to wear an intrauterine 
device (“IUD”).  Second, Xu claims to fear persecution on account of her membership in 
and activities on behalf of the Chinese Democratic Party (“CDP”), which she first joined 
in 2009 while in the United States.  She claims that the Chinese government monitors 
CDP activities in the United States and will identify her as a CDP member and arrest her 
if she returns. 
 Xu testified to these events and offered evidence before the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”).  Regarding her family-planning claim, she testified that she had her IUD removed 
after entering the United States, and she submitted what purports to be a copy of a 
sonogram showing the presence of the IUD and a receipt purporting to document her 
payment for its removal.  Regarding her political claim, she testified that she has been an 
active member of the CDP in the United States and has attended many protests, including 
protests before the Chinese embassy and consulate.  She further testified that she has 
written two articles in opposition to China‟s policies that were posted on the CDP‟s 
website along with her name and picture.  In addition, she testified that Chinese 
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authorities warned her father in China about her activities and told him that she would be 
arrested in China if she did not leave the CDP.  She supported her testimony with 
photographs of her attending demonstrations and copies of her articles, though not with 
an affidavit or letter from her father.  She also supported her testimony with the live 
testimony of Jian Qiang Li, a fellow CDP member, who testified about Xu‟s activities on 
behalf of the party and his belief that the Chinese government would identify and arrest 
her on return. 
 The IJ assumed that Xu‟s testimony was credible but denied her claims and 
ordered her removal to China.  With regard to Xu‟s family-planning claim, the IJ 
concluded that her asylum application was untimely because she had not submitted it 
within one year of entering the United States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).  The IJ also 
concluded that she would not be entitled to relief on that claim in any event because she 
failed to adequately corroborate it and because her claimed mistreatment—insertion of an 
IUD and the loss of her job—did not rise to the level of persecution.  The IJ did not apply 
the one-year bar to Xu‟s political claim.  Instead, the IJ denied that claim because he 
concluded that Xu had not adequately corroborated it and thus had not met her burden of 
proof.  In particular, the IJ concluded that Xu had not submitted any evidence that the 
Chinese government is aware of her activities in the United States or would identify and 
harm her on return.  In that regard, the IJ noted that Xu had not submitted a letter or 
affidavit from her father.  The IJ also rejected Li‟s testimony because the factual basis of 
his opinions was not clear and was not supported by objective evidence such as a 
Department of State Country Report, of which there was none in the record.  In sum, the 
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IJ concluded that Xu had not met her burden of proving eligibility for asylum, the higher 
burden of proving entitlement to withholding of removal, or that she faces torture if 
returned to China. 
 Xu appealed to the BIA and submitted various items of evidence for the first time 
on appeal, including a statement from her father and the 2009 Country Report.  On 
December 23, 2011, the BIA dismissed her appeal.  The BIA declined to consider Xu‟s 
new evidence for the first time on appeal and declined to remand in light of that new 
evidence because Xu did not show that it was previously unavailable.  The BIA also 





 Xu challenges three of the BIA‟s rulings on review.  First, she challenges the 
denial of asylum on her political claim based on her membership in and activities on 
behalf of the CDP.  The BIA rejected this claim for lack of corroboration that the Chinese 
government is aware of those activities and intends to harm her if she is returned to 
China.  The BIA properly required proof of those circumstances, see Leng v. Mukasey, 
528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008), and Xu does not argue otherwise.  The only argument 
she raises on this point is that her testimony was deemed credible and that credible 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We review the BIA‟s ruling but look 
to that of the IJ to the extent that the BIA affirmed and reiterated the IJ‟s conclusions.  
See Sandie v. Att‟y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review factual findings 
for substantial evidence and must treat them as “„conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‟”  Id. at 251 (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  We review legal issues de novo.  See id. 
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testimony alone is sufficient to carry her burden of proof.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).  It was well-settled even before the REAL ID Act (which applies here), 
however, that IJs may require even credible applicants to provide reasonable 
corroborating evidence.  See Sandie, 562 F.3d at 252.  That principle is now codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).  Xu neither acknowledges this principle nor raises any 
argument on review that the IJ erred in demanding corroboration or in analyzing that 
issue.  See Sandie, 562 F.3d at 252-53.  She also raised no such argument before the BIA, 
as the BIA noted.  Thus, Xu has both waived and failed to exhaust any argument in this 
regard.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
2
 
 Second, Xu challenges the denial of relief on her family-planning claim.  The IJ 
denied asylum on this claim because Xu did not file her asylum application within one 
year of entering the United States, and the BIA agreed.  We lack jurisdiction to review 
that ruling.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).  Thus, Xu appropriately limits her argument on 
this claim to the denial of withholding of removal (she raises no separate argument as to 
her claims under CAT).  Xu argues that she is entitled to withholding because the 
insertion of the IUD and loss of her employment in China constitute past persecution, 
which raises a presumption that she more likely than not will be persecuted in the future.  
                                                 
2
 We nevertheless note that the IJ identified the testimony for which he sought 
corroboration and that Xu had an opportunity to explain its absence.  See Sandie, 562 
F.3d at 253.  Xu testified that she had not submitted a statement from her father because 
“I didn‟t think of it at the time, to ask my father for written documents, because at that 
time my father was just strongly requesting me to withdraw from the organization to stop 
participating.”  (A.R. 202).  The IJ acknowledged that explanation and, though he did not 




See Garcia v. Att‟y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 505 (3d Cir. 2011).  The BIA affirmed the denial 
of this claim both because Xu failed to corroborate it and because her allegations do not 
rise to the level of persecution in any event.  Xu does not challenge or even acknowledge 
the second of these independent reasons for denying her claim and instead raises an 
argument addressed solely to the first.  We need not consider that argument because the 
BIA‟s ruling would stand even if it were persuasive.  We note, however, both that Xu‟s 




 Finally, Xu argues that the BIA erred and denied her due process in refusing to 
consider the new evidence she submitted on appeal, which is summarized in the margin.
4
  
                                                 
3
 The BIA properly determined that the insertion of an IUD and loss of employment, 
without more, do not rise to the level of persecution.  See Cheng v. Att‟y Gen., 623 F.3d 
175, 188, 192-94 (3d Cir. 2010).  Xu did not testify to any aggravating circumstances 
regarding the insertion of her IUD or to any extreme financial hardship caused by her 
violation of China‟s family planning policies that might have caused her IUD insertion 
and loss of employment, considered together, to rise to that level.  See id. at 193-94.  She 
does not claim otherwise on review.  Instead, she argues only that the IJ erred in rejecting 
her evidence regarding the IUD, which was a copy of a sonogram purporting to show its 
presence and copies of receipts purporting to document her payment for its removal.  The 
IJ rejected this proof as “meager” because neither the receipts nor the apparent sonogram 
contain any details that would permit him to determine what they are.  We cannot say that 
that assessment was erroneous.  (A.R. 349-50.)  Xu argues that the IJ had a duty to raise 
those concerns and question her about them at the hearing, but Xu addressed both the 
underlying events and her evidence in her testimony (A.R. 204-05), and we perceive no 
error in this regard. 
 
4
 Xu submitted:  (1) a letter from her father corroborating her testimony about threats 
from the Chinese government; (2) a letter from a former co-worker in China 
corroborating Xu‟s testimony that she was fired for violating China‟s family-planning 
policies; (3) a letter from a physician stating that Xu had an IUD removed in 2004; (4) a 
letter from the self-professed “person in charge” of the CDP regarding China‟s repression 
of the CDP generally; (5) a letter from another CDP member asserting that she suffered 
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We disagree.  The BIA explained that, as an appellate body, it “cannot” consider 
evidence first offered on appeal.  Xu argues that the BIA‟s own precedent allows it to do 
so under certain circumstances.  See In re Godfrey, 13 I. & N. Dec. 790, 791 n.1 (BIA 
1971); In re SS. Captain Demosthenes, 13 I. & N. Dec. 345, 346 n.1 (BIA 1969); In re 
N—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 506, 511-12 (BIA 1961).  As another court has recognized, however, 
this line of authority has been superseded by subsequent regulations.  See Ramirez-
Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 865, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2003).  The current 
regulations prohibit the BIA from engaging in fact-finding on review.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(3)(iv).  We thus perceive no reversible error in this regard.
5
 
                                                                                                                                                             
unspecified “personal persecution and detains [sic]” after returning to China from the 
United States; and (6) the 2009 Country Report.  (A.R. 58-154.)  Aside from the Country 
Report, which was issued over three months before the IJ‟s decision, all of this evidence 
is dated within days thereafter. 
 
5
 We note that the regulation permits the BIA to take administrative notice on appeal of 
“„the contents of official documents,‟” including Country Reports.  Sheriff v. Att‟y Gen., 
587 F.3d 584, 592 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)).  In concluding 
that it “cannot” consider Xu‟s new evidence, which included the 2009 Country Report, 
the BIA appears to have been unaware of this discretion.  Ordinarily, we might remand 
for the BIA to consider and exercise that discretion in the first instance.  In this case, 
however, there is no need to do so.  The BIA rejected Xu‟s political claim because she 
did not submit any evidence that the Chinese government (1) is aware of her political 
activity in the United States and intends to harm her on return, or (2) has a pattern or 
practice of so treating those similarly situated.  Xu relies on a portion of the 2009 
Country Report stating that “the CDP remained banned, and the government continued to 
monitor, detain and imprison current and former CDP members.”  (A.R. 105.)  (Xu 
purports to quote additional statements from this report, Petr.‟s Br. at 9-10, but those 
statements are not actually contained in the report or anything else of record.  We trust 
that the misquotation was inadvertent.)  Neither this statement nor anything else in the 
2009 Country Report, however, speaks to the Chinese government‟s awareness of 
political activities in the United States or its identification and treatment of those who 
engage in them.  The BIA also declined to consider the 2009 Country Report for the 
independent reason that it was previously available, which it indisputably was.  Thus, it is 
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 We also perceive no error in the BIA‟s refusal to reopen and remand Xu‟s case to 
the IJ on the basis of this new evidence.  The BIA explained that Xu did not satisfy the 
standard for reopening because she did not show that her new evidence was previously 
unavailable.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1003.2(c)(1).  On review, Xu argues that “[t]he Petitioner 
was unable to get a letter from her father [before the hearing] because her home and her 
father were both monitored by the Chinese government, so her father was not able to send 
any letter to her.”  (Petr.‟s Br. at 9.)  Xu did not present this argument (which conflicts 
with the explanation she gave at her hearing) to the BIA.  Nor has she explained how 
those alleged circumstances changed in order to permit her father to send her a letter just 
four days after the IJ‟s decision. 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
“highly probable” that neither the BIA‟s consideration of this report nor its recognition of 
its discretion to consider it would have had any bearing on the BIA‟s ruling.  Yuan v. 
Att‟y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting harmless error on immigration 
review). 
